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Book Notes 639 
Scarre, Geoffey. Utilitarianism. 
New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. 225. $55.00 (cloth); $17.95 (paper). 
Scarre sympathizes with utilitarianism but doubts it is "wholly satisfactory" (p. 1). 
He devotes a chapter toJ. S. Mill and sections to Mo Tzu, Jesus, Aristotle, Epicu- 
rus, Hutcheson, Hume, Godwin, and Bentham, but insufficiently integrates his- 
torical views into contemporary debates and insufficiently documents claims 
(e.g., p. 35). 
Scarre rightly doubts the consequentialist/deontology dichotomy, since de- 
ontologists can exclusively advocate forward-looking goals (e.g., prevent injus- 
tice, minimize inequality) and utilitarian emphasis on intended results looks 
backward to intent (p. 11). He generally supports David Lyons in undermining 
the act/rule utilitarianism dichotomy. 
Utilitarianism seems wrong, since it intrinsicallyvalues happiness in Schaden- 
freude, sadism, racism, sexism, and so forth. Scarre spiritedly defends utilitarian- 
ism, claiming such harmful debasing of others precludes happiness by under- 
mining self-respect; for example, sadistic spectators cannot distinguish themselves 
from criminals een punished (p. 159). But sadists and criminals are distinct, glee 
from an enemy's cancer seems harmlessly evil, and hardened criminals seem 
happy (e.g., rationalization, self-deception, intoxication) unless punished. Scarre 
calls killing "that ultimate utility-destroying act" but thrill-killing mercy-killers 
maximize utility (pp. 132 and 210). 
Is utilitarianism too demanding? Scarre convincingly rebuts utilitarian de- 
fenses from David Brink and Peter Railton as promoting self-deception, elit- 
ism, and underestimation of how intensely satisfying altruism normally is (pp. 
194-95). 
I recommend utilizing this clear, comprehensive introduction. Its bibliog- 
raphy lists 250 works. S. V H. 
Loewy, Erich H. Moral Strangers, Moral Acquaintance, and Moral Friends: 
Connectedness and Its Conditions. 
Albany, N.Y: SUNYPress, 1997. Pp. 251. $18.95 (paper). 
Loewy offers a sustained critique of libertarianism, especially H. T. Engelhardt's 
version, as callous and as failing to realize the full possibilities for human soli- 
darity. More (too?) quickly he also critiques the ethics of care as being unrealistic, 
paternalistic, and anti-intellectual. Integrating ideas of Rousseau, Kant, and Dar- 
win, he sets forth an engaging view of ethics as motivated by natural compassion 
and socially constructed within democracies. Much of the book is an impassioned 
plea for greater moral concern for others. 
The book is rich in ideas, such as compassionate rationality and social ho- 
meostasis. Yet it suffers from an unresolved tension between two theses: (1) ethics 
(including rights) are entirely social constructs whose content is decided by de- 
mocracies, and (2) ethics has a natural basis in compassion together with the 
worth of all creatures capable of suffering. A related ambiguity is in two concep- 
tions of a general will as (a) "nothing more than a capacity to communicate" 
(p. 83), and (b) common interests (p. 80). Statement (1) plus (a) seem in- 
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sufficient o overthrow libertarianism in democracies that choose to embrace 
it; (2) seems to refute (1), at least if "compassion" carries as much normative 
force as Loewy needs to reach his conclusions. M. W. M. 
Taylor, Richard. RestoringPride: The Lost Virtue of OurAge. 
Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1996. Pp. 232. $23.95 (cloth). 
Taylor advances four principal (and related) theses: (1) that "some people are 
better as human beings than others" (p.15); (2) that the best life involves creative 
activity; (3) that it also involves treating others considerately; and (4) that one's 
primary obligation is to oneself. The book is exhortatory throughout, with Taylor 
continually urging the reader to lead a creative life. 
He defends the first wo theses along Aristotelian lines. Happiness, like vir- 
tue (or excellence), consists in personal fulfillment, which entails the exercise of 
the uniquely human function of reasoning, which is best manifested through any 
activity involving creative intelligence. Such activity is the exclusive basis for per- 
sonal excellence and thus for pride, that is, for self-love and for the belief in one's 
superiority to"ordinary people" (p. 30). He defends the third thesis along egoist 
lines: a fulfilling life requires not only achievements but also satisfactory relation- 
ships with others; hence one cannot afford to treat them inconsiderately. 
The book is not without its flaws. He does not defend the fourth thesis. He 
both maintains (p. 60) and denies (p. 47) that all of us can lead creative lives. 
Again, he both maintains (p. 192) and denies (p. 160) that it is essential to the 
pride of the virtuous that they treat others considerately. His egoist stance that if 
"you are proud you love yourself... above everything else" (p. 94), and that self- 
fulfillment "is the only thing ... worth struggling for" (p. 207), clearly under- 
mines his claim that his view of human nature "implies nothing whatever con- 
cerning [traditional, i.e., beneficent or altruistic] morality" (p. 112). Finally, he 
appears to be mistaken in treating pride not merely as a state dependent upon 
the possession of virtue, but in addition as a virtue in its own right. These prob- 
lems notwithstanding, the book has much to recommend it, both to the general 
reader and, in an introductory ethics course, as a lucid, distinctive (because ex- 
hortatory), and provocative companion to Aristotle. N. P. L. 
Nielsen, Kai, and Ware, Robert, eds. Exploitation. 
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997. Pp. 364. $19.95 (paper). 
This solid and very useful volume brings together twenty-one essays on exploita- 
tion. Many of the essays are recent, and most of them are by well-known writers, 
such as Allen Wood, Jon Elster, and David Schweickart, Anwar Shaikh, Nancy 
Holmstrom, G. A. Cohen,John Roemer, and Nancy Folbre. Although all but one 
of the essays were previously published, some of them are difficult o find, and 
the editors have done a good job of selecting and organizing them. To those 
familiar with the subject, it should come as no surprise that so-called analytical 
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